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section may not be used to accomplish what is in effect a merger.29 If the merger
device had been used here, and if the dissenters had elected to take the appraised
value of their shares, a question of valuation would be raised, of course, similar
to the question involved in the principal case. 30
The case has been remanded to the district court for the determination of
damages in accordance with the opinion of the appellate court. This will be
found to be no easy task. It is not impossible that the difficulties may lead the
district court to find that the value of the minority's stock in this "going pros-
perous concern" is actually no more than their proportionate share of the value
of the physical assets. In that event, if the district court should make findings
adequately analyzing the source of the steamship company's earnings, it should
not be impossible to induce the appellate court to sustain the decision.
PROIIBITIONS AGAINST MULTIPLE STATE
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF IN-
TANGIBLES REMOVED*
The State Tax Commission of Utah taxed' shares of stock of a Utah corpora-
tion that were transferred at the death of a New York domiciliary., In a proceed-
ing before the trial court the administrators contention that the inheritance tax
was invalid under the holding of First National Bank of Boston v. Maine' was
sustained. The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the trial court, 3 specifying that
2? The holding of the Inland decision might be construed to support this distinction since
there is language in the case that implies that the so-called dissolution was a weak device by
means of which the majority stockholder appropriated the transportation business of its sub-
sidiary. If this is the true construction to be put on the opinion, however, it is difficult to recon-
cile it with the previous decision in which the steel company was permitted to proceed with its
plans to dissolve the subsidiary and purchase its assets; cf. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.,
i6 Del. Ch. 318, 147 At. 257 (1929); In re Doe Run Lead Co., 283 Mo. 646, 223 S.W. 6oo
(I92o); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 ( 9o4).
30 See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 233 (ig3i); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Corn.
L. Q. 420 (1930).
* State Tax Com'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
x Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) §§ 80-12-2, 8o-12-3.
2 284 U.S. 312 (1932). The Court held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment the at-
tempt by Maine, the state of incorporation as well as the situs of the corporate property, to tax
the transfer-by-death of shares of stock owned by a Massachusetts domiciliary. Massachusetts
had taxed the transfer as the state of domicile of the shareholder. This ruling was the culmina-
tion of the outlawing of double taxation of intangibles which was begun in 1930 in Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (I93o), and continued in Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U.S. 586 (1930), and Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 282 U.S. 1 (193o).
3 x16 P. (2d) 923 (Utah, 194).
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until the First National Bank case was expressly overruled by the Supreme
Court, the deviation made from it in Curry V. McCanless4 had to be confined to
its facts. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held, judgment reversed.
Since Utah has power over the corporation by virtue of its corporation law,
which also protects and benefits the stock, Utah may tax the transfer even
though the result is multiple taxation. State Tax Com'n of Utah v. Aldrich.s
After a ten-year period during which state multiple taxation had been held
invalid,6 the Court, in the instant case, expressly reversed the tiend. Decisions7
which were made prior to that period and which upheld such taxes were held,
rather, to have been sound. The Court in those earlier decisions had held that
a state could tax whenever it had power over the subject-matter or over the
persons involved, or whenever it had given protection or benefit either by its
laws or by maintaining an "orderly society," and this theory was adopted by the
present court.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter formulated the doctrine thus: "The simple but con-
trolling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask re-
turn." s Unfortunately the Court did not offer any standards by which the
state's compensation could be measured in accordance with the benefit given.
It appears that once a state has the right to tax, it can impose the same tax-rate
on a partially benefited non-resident that it does on those enjoying the full bene-
fits conferred by the state upon its residents.9
Another source of doubt lies in the Court's failure to draw any clear distinc-
tion between tangible and intangible property.'0 In Curry v. McCanless the
Court said that a state might tax as intangibles a share of stock or a contract or
a mortgage. 2 At the same time the Court observed that intangibles "are but re-
4307 U.S. 357 (1939). In a 5-4 decision, the Court permitted the taxation of intangibles
of a testamentary trust by both Tennessee, the domicile of the decedent settlor who had
reserved powers of management and a power of appointment, and Alabama, the domicile of the
trustee and the location of the intangibles. The Court denied that the Fourteenth Amendment
-provided a rule of immunity against double taxation. The language of the Court could be in-
terpreted as an overruling of the cases supporting a prohibition against double taxation. Dodd,
Cases on Constitutional Law io3 (3d ed.19 4 r).
'316 U.S. 174 (1942).
Note 2 supra.
7 Prior to 1930 the benefit and protection theory had been applied by the Court to validate
multiple taxation. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. x89 (i9o3); Harding, Double Taxation of
Property and Incomd 13-21 (i933); Stinson, The Due Process of State Taxation, 29 Geo. L. J.
271, 275 n. I5 (i94o).
9 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (i94o).
9 Dix, Must We Carry Our Stocks and Bonds in Our Pockets?, 15 Ind. L. J. 373 (1940).
xo "Tangible Personal Property" and the Law of Inheritance Taxation, 35 Yale L. J., 357
(1926); "Double" Inheritance Taxation of Intangibles, 40 Yale L. J. 99 (1930).
11307 U.S. 357 (1939). X2 Ibid., at 365 n. 3.
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lationships between persons, natural or corporate, which the law recognizes by
attaching to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts.'"3 Strictly speaking,
all property consists of relationships. Therefore, the Court attempted to go
further, for it specified that a right which could be directly related to a physical
object was a tangible.14 In this setting the traditional notions of corporate fic-
tions facilitate understanding a tax imposed upon shareholders. The mort-
gagees' position, however, is difficult to grasp. The security interest as such of
the mortgagee has long been a favorite of the courts; there seems to be little
doubt that the right is directly related to a physical object.'s The instant case
does not dispel the doubts created by former decisions concerning intangibles.
It can hardly be supposed that the Court is unaware of all the undesirable
effects of multiple taxation. It is in spite of this awareness that the Court has,
for reasons not too obvious, returned the problem to the states. The language of
the Court would seem to permit a strong inference that here is another instance
where the justices hesitate to inject their personal predilections.,6 Furthermore,
the states are not restricted in this taxing field in any constitutional manner.17
Reasoning in this manner, the Court can say, and their sincerity cannot be
questioned, "Whether a tax is wise or expedient is the business of the political
branches of government, not ours."' 8 Historically, states have enjoyed the
privilege of taxing intangibles, notwithstanding that the result is multiple taxa-
tion, and the Court feels this strengthens its position.1
Another element is involved in the fact that modern businesses have con-
tinued to extend their operations through many states which all contribute to
the well-being of the enterprise. The Court is convinced that each state is the
proper judge of the price a business, or one benefiting from that business, should
pay for the privilege granted."° Certainly no exception can be taken to this posi-
tion of the Court. As stated above, however, a genuine problem exists regarding
sensible payment for the benefit given. For example, what is the status of the
holding in a case like Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton?" There the
Court refused to allow a state to impose a death transfer tax on corporate shares
when two-thirds of the corporate property and a part of its general business ac-
tivity occurred within its jurisdiction. The Court said that a shareholder is not
13 Ibid., at 366.
'4 Ibid., at 364-66.
Xs 5 Tiffany, Law of Real Property §§ 1379, 138o (3d ed. 1939); but compare Wright v. Vin-
ton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (I937) with Wright v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
16 Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 27, 28 (1942).
V7 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 3xi U.S. 435, 445 (r94o); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357, 373-74 (i939); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Ed. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313, 323-24
(1939).
"9 State Tax Com'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 184 (1942).
"g Ibid., at 176-78.
20 Ibid., at z83-84. 2270 U.S. 69 (1926).
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the owner of the corporate property and that jurisdiction over the property did
not confer a right to tax the shareholder. Under the benefit theory emphasized
in the instant case, the strength of the Rhode Island case loses force. Although a
long established fiction exists that a shareholder is not the owner of the corpo-
rate property,- the fiction need not be destroyed in order to allow the Court to
decide that protection to the corporate property can measure the protection to
the corporate shares.23
In allowing the states to indulge in this taxing competition the Court seems
to rely on the states' ability and willingness to face and solve this problem. Ex-
perience has taught us, however, that judicial and administrative rulings on the
reciprocal legislation that is written during these cooperative state moves will
result in a prolific source of litigation.24 It is doubtful whether problems of uni-
formity in rates, methods of computation, and formulae for equitable apportion-
ment 5 can be left to those whose self-interest may tend to overvalue the bene-
fit given the taxpayer.26 Nevertheless, the Court's refusal to indulge in judicial
legislation may be laudable. The only sensible solution at hand despite possible
constitutional questions seems to be a system of federal taxation accompanied
by revenue apportionment to the states perhaps in a manner comparable to
grants-in-aid.27 Since the problem requires intensive thought and planning, pre-
sumably the Court would prefer that the appeal be made to Congress. While
some economists5 and lawyers 29 favor this solution, the class most adversely af-
fected by the intangible rule established in the instant case is hardly likely to
bring sufficient pressure to bear on the legislature to move them to action.30
221 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 31 (i93i).
23 Cf. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (194o), noted in 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 6o5
('94').
'4 This observation was made in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent. State Tax Com'n of Utah v.
Aldrichb, 316 U.S. I74, I99 (1942).
2SReciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 643-45 (1930). This
question might be posed: If the states are faced with reciprocal legislation as the only answer
to this problem, how long will it take to get results? After thirty-five years, only thirty-four
states have accomplished the relatively simple task of adopting the Uniform Sales Act.
'
6 Hellerstein and Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 949,
96o-61, 975-76 (,941); Reciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 64r, 646
(193o); Legislative Efforts in New York to Avoid Multiplicity in Inheritance Taxation, 28
Col. L. Rev. 8o6, 807 ly. 6 (1928). After the First National Bank case, New York amended its
constitution so that a non-resident would not be taxed for intangibles found within the state of
New York. N.Y. Const. Art. 16, § 3. New York will be forced to amend its constitution to take
advantage of the ruling in the instant case.
'7 Dodd, The Decreasing Importance of State Lines, 27 A. B. A. J. 78, 83, 84 (I941).
Bueher, Public Finance 473-74 (2d ed. i94o); Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem 26-27, 370
(1937); compare Simons, Personal Income Taxation 214-I8 (1938).
9Hellerstein and Hennefeld, op. cit. supra note 2, at 963.
30 Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson. State Tax Com'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S.
174, 195-96 (1942).
